Abstract-Access control AAA infrastructures are traditionally used by the service providers so as to charge their subscribers. Given the easiness and the cheapness of MANET deployment and provided that charging is possible, service providers are likely to offer their services over MANET. In previous works [1] and [2], we presented a distributed AAA framework for MANET. We propose to evaluate the runtime of this framework authentication protocol by modeling and simulating typical cases that are fairly representative of the reality and can easily be extended.
evaluation of the runtime using two methods: modeling and simulation. The fourth section is dedicated to the modeling part where we make some hypothesis to establish our model. The fifth section is dedicated to the simulations that serve to validate our model.
II. RELATED WORKS
The most well known research works that considered the distribution of an authentication service to multiple servers proposed distributing the Certification Authority (CA).
COCA [3] defined and simulated a distributed CA architec ture for local networks with Ethernet connections at 100 Mbps and focused specially on solutions for some given security at tacks that the CA may undergo. It did not analyze formally the time necessary to accomplish client requests for certificates. Moreover the protocol messages went through delegate servers before reaching the CA servers, which increased the number of rounds and so the overhead.
MOCA [4] defined, however, a less complex protocol than that of COCA. Simulations, only, were used to evaluate it. DIC TA TE [5] is another solution for requesting certificates to a distributed CA. The defined protocol is based on prob abilistic quorum systems and is much more complex than the protocol we propose in this paper. As several rounds are required, a modeling was proposed, however it did not address the protocol runtime.
III. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL WITHIN A MANET
DISTRIBUTED AAA INFRASTRUCTURE A centralized AAA infrastructure is traditionally composed of an AAA server, an AAA client located in a Network Access Server, and a client (a subscriber) which authenticates to the AAA server via the AAA client before accessing to the operator's network. To distribute this architecture and make access control possible in ad-hoc networks, we replace the single server by a group of AAA servers and we place the AAA client directly into the client (subscriber) device. As such, an ad-hoc node (any node from the ad-hoc network) is either an AAA server or an AAA client. AAA clients and AAA servers form the distributed AAA framework.
AAA servers are chosen and bootstrapped by an offline authority that generates the system key and shares it (by means of threshold cryptography [1], [6] , [7] ) among the servers. The key-shares are so configured and will be refreshed by this authority. Clients credentials are also configured by this same authority that also fills their caches with the servers addresses.
An authentication protocol, at the application layer, takes place between an AAA client, e.g. a Joining Node IN, and the group of AAA servers. Both parties authenticate themselves using RSA asymmetric cryptography [8] . During the authenti cation phase, the IN connects to the AAA servers. Actually, by means of threshold cryptography, it requests authentication to at least a threshold number of them. For the sake of simplicity, we take the threshold number equal to the number of AAA servers in our paper.
Here are the execution steps of the authentication protocol [2] :
(1) IN sends to each server a request for authentication that includes its identity (present in its public key certificate), MSGl: {IDJN}. Once the IN successfully validates the integrity of the servers signature pieces (by combining them first [7) ), the mutual authentication between the IN and the servers is considered as successful. IN is henceforward authorized to access the network.
So far, authentication and authorization have been addressed in this framework. The accounting function is not yet sup ported, but, as a hot topic, it will be addressed in future works.
IV. PROTOCOL MODELING FOR A THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF THE AUTHENTICATION RUNTIME
The present section outlines the reasoning for building a model and computing the runtime of the authentication protocol exposed in section III. It starts by analyzing the events sequence at the nodes from the construction of the first message MSG 1 by the IN until its reception by one of the AAA servers, call it AAAj (cf. Fig.I ). Once the runtime of MSG 1 with one single server is known, the reasoning simply applies to the other three messages of the protocol, MSG2, MSG3, and MSG4, and for the remaining servers, AAA 1, AAA 2 , ... , AAAn if n is the number of servers.
Our analysis takes into account the possible retransmissions of messages by the MAC layer, and assumes that the DCF technic used is basic DCF ( [10] , [II) ). 2) After going through the Network and the Transport Layers, the packet is processed by the AAA Application
Layer during AP PdAAA. Thereby, the delay d 1 j for the first packet generation, transmission to AAAj and processing is: 
The delay W Ldk is a positive random variable having as a distribution function F W L dk• It takes into consideration the prospective retransmissions of a packet as described by the DCF basic access mechanism. The maximum number of retransmissions is equal to seven as defined in the IEEE 802.11 specifications [10] . If P is the probability of retransmission for a packet in the wireless channel, and X the number of retransmissions (X is a discrete random variable that covers the values of the set {1..7}), then:
{ P(X = i) = p i (l � p) for 0 :':: i :':: 6 P(X = 7) = p 7 P(X = i) = 0 for i ::;> 8
The Total Probability Law [12] allows to write the following formula: If we suppose that the emission time necessary to deliver one byte is a positive continuous random variable, following an exponential distribution with parameter A (the average byte rate), then the necessary mean time to deliver I bytes is 1/ A.
Since I indicates the length of an authentication message, I is large enough (cf. 
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Consequently, using the classical er f function [14] : for respectively the first and the second round-trip of the protocol through the server AAA j , and n the number of AAA servers. The delays {d 12 j h :S j :S n (respectively {d34 j h :S j :S n )
are different for each server (because the transmissions on the links between the IN and the AAA servers can not be exactly the same for each link and at any moment), however they follow the same probability law. Also, suppose that the number of hops between the IN and each server is the same i.e. equal to ho p s (cf. the example of Fig.3 when ho p s = 3 and n = 3).
During the first round-trip and for threshold cryptography reasons, IN has to wait for all the servers responses before triggering the second round-trip with all the servers. There are two possible approaches to compute the delay to achieve the first round-trip with all the servers: 1) "Max" model approach: IN waits the maximum of the {d 12 j h :S j :S n'
2) "Sum" model approach: IN waits the sum of the {d1 2 j h :S j :S n.
In the real case, it waits the maximum. But because the network simulator NS-2 is unable to simulate parallel events and rather executes them one after another [15] , it actually waits the sum. So the delay D 12s um to achieve the first round trip with all the servers is:
As {d1 2 j h :S j :S n follow the same probability law and that the expected value (or mean [13] ) is a linear operator:
n n
Similarly the delay D34 sum to achieve the second round-trip with all the servers verifies:
If D indicates the total delay for a successful authentication, then:
where E(D) is the expected value of the total delay i.e. the authentication protocol runtime. Its expression is not given here intentionally because it is quite long and complex. We simply draw its profile in the next section. You can find more computing details in [11] . The runtime E(D) depends on the parameters summarized in the table 1. The probability of retransmissions is supposed fixed here.
The number of servers is n E {I , ... , 6} and the number of hops is ho p s E {I , ... , 1O}. The spread technic we employed is DS SS. The length of messages were indicated according to their content (cf. section III) and following the example given in [16] . FigA depicts the evolution of the runtime E(D) when the number of AAA servers and the number of hops increase.
As expected, E(D) increases when n rises and when ho p s rises. The form of the curves when n increases and when ho p s increases is roughly a line segment. The values range is between about 0.01 sec for n = 1 and ho p s = 1 and 0.29 sec for n = 6 and ho p s = 10.
V. PROTOCOL SIMULATION FOR A PRACTICAL EVALUATION OF THE AUTHENTICATION RUNTIME
We used the simulator NS-2. In the simulation, nodes were placed on concentric circles of the same center: the joining node IN. Servers are on the outermost circle of radius 100· ho p s meters. They are placed in such a way that angles are equal between them. Relaying nodes are at the intersection Fig. 5 .
Nodes placement in simulation flat-grid (n = 3, hops = 3)
of the lines joining the IN to the servers with the circles of radius r E {100 , "'" 100, (ho p s -1), 100, ho p s} (cf. Fig,S )"
The routing protocol used is AODV and the communication range of the nodes is 120 meters, Each value in Fig,6 was measured 100 times, The similarity between Fig,6 and FigA is striking, The range of values is slightly larger for the simulation, This difference is due to the accumulated delays of transmissions and receptions of the packets between the layers of the nodes, In the model, we supposed that these delays were negligible, However in the simulations, we realized, after processing NS-2 log files, that these delays represent about 30% of the total runtime for each value of the Fig,6 , So if we add 30% to each runtime value of the FigA, we will obtain approximatly the values of Fig,6 , Besides, it is also to be noted that the probability of retransmission depends in fact on the number of nodes and their distribution in the network and on the amount of traffic, Its value is not fixed as we supposed in the modeL But our simulations demonstrated that, in our case, its value is always less than 0,1 and the fact that it is not fixed has no impact on the shape and the values of FigA, These findings are of great importance because they prove that our model is valid, They also prove that the authentication protocol is scalable for different numbers of servers and different numbers of hops, They would remain valid if the model was computing the maximum of the message delays through the servers rather than their sum: the maximum is indeed at most equal to the sum,
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we analyzed the runtime resulting from the authentication of a joining node by a distributed AAA framework within a mobile ad-hoc network. The built model demonstrates that when routes are already established, the runtime increases as the number of servers rises and as the number of hops rises too, This value doesn't exceed 380 milliseconds for a maximum of 6 servers and 10 hops, The undertaken simulations validated our model and hence showed that the investigated protocol is scalable when the routes are already established,
In the future, dynamic scenarios with multiple joining nodes will be treated to generalize these results, Later, a trade-off has to be found between the number of AAA servers to use and the maximum runtime to tolerate,
